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The False Claims Act (FCA)1 originated during the Civil War at 
President Lincoln's request to counter seemingly rampant fraud by suppliers 
for the Union army.2 More recently, the False Claims Act has enjoyed a 
renaissance in large part as a prominent tool in the Obama Administration's 
efforts to combat fraud committed by healthcare providers receiving federal 
funding.3 In particular, since President Obama took office in 2009, the 
Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services have dramatically 
increased efforts to recover fraudulently obtained Medicare payments from 
healthcare providers who knowingly submitted inflated claims and claims for 
payment to which the providers were not entitled.4 The renewed popularity of 
the False Claims Act results mainly from its relatively unique characteristic 
that expressly permits private individuals called "relators" to bring civil 
actions against defrauders on behalf of the United States.5 Such lawsuits are 
known as "qui tam actions."6 In recent years, the Department of Justice has 
lauded the "public-private partnership" of the qui tam mechanism as a 
                                                             
1 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012). 
2 See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 184 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (describing enactment of original False Claims Act). 
3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, SPRING 2011 SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, PART III: 
LEGAL & INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
3–4 (2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/ 
archives/semiannual/index.asp. 
4 Tracy Russo, HEAT: A Year of Tracking Health Care Fraud, THE 
JUSTICE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2010), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/934 
(discussing joint efforts since May 2009 of DOJ and HHS to combat fraud 
and abuse within Medicare and Medicaid). 
5 See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 184 & n.6 (citations omitted). 
6 See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 463 n.2 (2007) 
(explaining that term comes from Latin "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
se ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning "who pursues this action on our Lord 
the King's behalf as well as his own."). 
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significant method of enforcement against those who defraud the 
Government.7 
Government support of qui tam False Claims Act lawsuits is premised 
upon the idea that the government may better combat fraud against it by 
encouraging "insider" relators to come forward with information about FCA 
violations that might otherwise go undiscovered.8 Yet there is an undeniable 
potential for abuse of the qui tam model by opportunistic relators driven by 
greed or revenge to bring less than meritorious FCA claims.9 
The False Claims Act allows relators to recover between fifteen and 
thirty percent of any recovery obtained through a qui tam action.10 Although 
the government receives a majority of any award recovered in any False 
Claims Act lawsuit, the relator's percentage may afford a substantial recovery 
given that False Claims Act defendants are generally liable for treble 
damages.11 
In addition to having to repay three times the amount of the fraudulent 
proceeds they acquire, defendants to qui tam False Claims Act allegations 
often must expend significant amounts of time and resources investigating 
allegations and mounting defenses thereto, regardless of the validity of a 
                                                             
7 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion 
in False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html. 
8 See Pamela H. Bucy, Federalism and False Claims, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1599, 1603 (2007). 
9 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 
939, 949 (1997) ("As a class of plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in 
kind than the Government. They are motivated primarily by prospects of 
monetary reward rather than public good."). 
10 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2). 
11 Id. § 3729(a)(1). 
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relator's contentions.12 Although it is not clear at this point whether such costs 
are passed along to healthcare consumers,13 the threat of this unintended 
consequence looms as massive amounts recovered in False Claims Act cases 
in recent years suggest that defendants face the unpleasant choice of paying 
substantial settlements or risking similarly large litigation expenses to deflect 
relators' claims. Indeed, even legislators in recent years acknowledge fearing 
that some healthcare providers may be coming to view such expenses as a 
"cost of doing business."14 This concern speaks to the deeper problem that if 
healthcare providers do in fact "budget" for the cost of defending FCA 
actions, those costs likely will be passed along to the consumers, either as the 
direct source of healthcare providers' revenue or indirectly through tax 
funding of Medicare and Medicaid disbursements. 
                                                             
12 See Pamela H. Bucy, States, Statutes and Fraud: A Study of Emerging 
State Efforts to Combat White Collar Crime, The University of Alabama 
School of Law (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372345. 
13 Compare Wally Kennedy, Freeman Health System to Pay $9.3 
Million for Improperly Compensating Physicians for Referrals, JOPLIN 
GLOBE (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://www.joplinglobe.com/topstories/ 
x880888555/Freeman-Health-System-to-pay-9-3-million-for-improperly-
compensating-physicians-for-referrals (quoting hospital representative as 
saying that, "In the future, patients will not see a difference in our costs 
because of" hospital's agreement to pay $9.3 million settlement related to 
violations of False Claims Act and other federal healthcare anti-fraud law), 
with Thomas Catan, Drug Makers Agree to $421 Million Settlement, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000  
1424052748703296604576005674095414668.html (noting that defendant 
"Roxanne Laboratories[ ] . . . said the expense of protracted litigation would 
have added to the cost of producing medicines and affected its 
competitiveness."). 
14 Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Hearing on "Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant 
Accomplishments and Ongoing Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud" 
(Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/  
testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da165adbf&wit_id=e655f9e28
09e5476862f735da165adbf-0-1. 
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As discussed more thoroughly herein, one relatively simple way to 
decrease both the costs of discovery, litigation defense, and to possibly limit 
damage awards in qui tam False Claims Act litigation is to de-incentivize 
dilatory litigation tactics by relators by clarifying the False Claims Act's 
statute of limitations.15 In particular, there is a need to eliminate uncertainty 
over that statute's tolling provision16 by limiting tolling to qui tam actions in 
which the government has intervened. This appears consistent with 
congressional intent17 and also helps to assure that a would-be relator will not 
conceal defendants' fraud for an indefinite period of time while relators' 
potential recovery accrues. This, in turn, would help to prevent frustration of 
the original purpose of the qui tam action and have the salutary effect of 
assuring timely prosecution of egregious frauds. 
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The original False Claims Act of 1863 imposed criminal sanctions on 
non-military personnel responsible for submitting "false claims" for payment 
to the United States Government.18 However, that Act also permitted private 
relators to bring qui tam actions to prosecute the fraud on the government's 
behalf.19 Under these provisions, successful relators received one-half of 
damages recovered.20 Subsequent congressional amendments diluted the 
                                                             
15 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). 
16 Id. § 3731(b)(2). 
17 United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 
288, 295 (4th Cir. 2008). 
18 See Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
529 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2000). 
19 See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 184 & n.6 (citations omitted). 
20 Id. at 184 n.6 (citing False Claims Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 
Stat. 696). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 250 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.50 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
Spring 2013  
False Claims Act's qui tam provisions, rendering relators' use of qui tam 
lawsuits infrequent and largely unsuccessful.21 
Congress reversed this trend in 1986, when it again amended the FCA to 
encourage qui tam lawsuits by private whistleblowers.22 Among these 
changes, the 1986 amendments increased recovery available to relators, 
including the addition of the fairly substantial mandatory minimum of fifteen 
percent of damages.23 The amendments also expanded the limitations period 
applicable to civil FCA claims.24 The results were notable. From the time the 
amendments took effect through 2008, qui tam relators filed 6,199 False 
Claims Act cases that resulted in over $13.6 billion of total damages awarded 
through settlements and judgments, of which relators have received more 
than $2.2 billion.25 
False Claims Act recoveries over the past four years have been even 
more remarkable,26 in part because of the Obama administration's tenacious 
pursuit of those who defraud the Federal Government.27 Indeed, the Patient 
                                                             
21 Bucy, supra note 12, at 1527 (citing various congressional 
amendments). 
22 Bucy, supra note 12, at 1527; see Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 
(1986). 
23 Bucy, supra note 12, at 1527–28 (citations omitted). 
24 Id. at 1528; see also note 12. 
25 Id. at 1528, see also note 6 (citing Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Fraud Statistics (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/  
November/fraud-statistics1986-2008.htm (visited Nov. 27, 2012)). 
26 Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fraud Statistics: October 1, 1987—
September 30, 2012 (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/  
docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [hereinafter Fraud Statistics]. 
27 See U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEAT TASK FORCE, 
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/heattaskforce/index.html (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2012). 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted in March 2010, 
further amended the False Claims Act to promote qui tam actions.28 
Most notably, the PPACA significantly reduced the so-called "public 
disclosure bar" on qui tam FCA actions based upon publicly-disclosed 
information.29 This change was enacted in three parts: First, whereas the 
previous FCA appeared to require dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction of qui tam complaints based on public information, the FCA as 
amended by the PPACA now provides courts with some discretion to retain 
jurisdiction over such actions.30 Second, the PPACA refined the definition of 
what qualifies as "publicly-disclosed information" in a way that expands the 
permissible bases of relators' allegations.31 Lastly, the PPACA broadened the 
"original source exception" to the public disclosure bar, which permits 
relators to base qui tam actions on publicly-disclosed information where the 
relator's allegations are based upon the relator's own independent 
knowledge.32 Through all of these measures the PPACA has increased 
relators' ability to maintain FCA claims and has resulted in a recent boom of 
such claims.33 
Over 2,000 False Claims Act cases were filed between 2009 and 2011, 
the vast majority were initiated by qui tam relators. During that same time 
period, settlements and judgments of False Claims Act cases totaled more 
                                                             
28 Josh Savitz & Erica Trachtman, False Statements & False Claims, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 737 (Spring 2012) (citing Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended throughout Titles 26 and 42, United 
States Code)). 
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590 ("PPACA") 
§ 1303(j), codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3731(e)(4) (2010). 
30 PPACA § 1303(j)(2), codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3731(e)(4)(A). 
31 PPACA § 1303(j)(2), codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3731(e)(4)(B). 
32 Id. 
33 Beverly Cohen, KABOOM! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims 
Under the Health Reform Law, 166 PENN ST. L. REV. 77, 77 (Summer 2011). 
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than $8.5 billion, of which relators received nearly $1.2 billion.34 In 2011 
alone, relators received over $532 million of the more than $3 billion total 
amount of False Claims Act settlements and judgments.35 
A. ELEMENTS OF A SUBSTANTIVE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
VIOLATION 
The same definitions apply to all relevant provisions of the False Claims 
Act36 ("FCA"). The statute defines "claim" as "a request or demand . . . for 
money or property that . . . is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of 
the United States."37 Thus, a healthcare provider is vulnerable to FCA 
liability anytime it submits a claim for payment directly or indirectly seeking 
reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid or any other federally-funded 
healthcare program.38 Although the FCA does not explain what makes a 
claim "false" and "fraudulent," courts generally construe these terms as 
requiring "a defendant to have aimed to extract from the government money 
the government otherwise would not have paid."39 A claim is "knowingly" 
false if the defendant acted with actual knowledge, or deliberate ignorance or 
reckless disregard, of "the truth or falsity of" the claim at issue.40 
                                                             
34 Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fraud Statistics: 1987–2011 
(Sept. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-
FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf. 
35 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 26, at n.248. 
36 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). 
37 Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(i). 
38 See generally Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180 (affirming and reversing in part 
dismissal of qui tam FCA complaint alleging fraudulent submissions to 
Medicare by various healthcare providers). 
39 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). 
40 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). 
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The prima facie elements of a False Claims Act violation depend on 
which subsection(s) of the FCA gives rise to the particular cause of action.41 
Nonetheless, at the heart of each major substantive FCA prohibition42 is the 
use of a false claim material to the United States' decision to pay or withhold 
payment from the defendant. In all such cases, there must be a "false claim" 
and the defendant(s) must have acted with "knowledge" as defined by the 
FCA.43 
B. QUI TAM LAWSUITS UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Congress's amendments of the False Claims Act in 1986 strengthened 
the FCA's qui tam provisions in a way that, among other things, enhanced 
financial rewards for relators whose qui tam actions prove successful.44 As 
noted above, under the amended FCA, a relator is entitled to recover between 
fifteen and thirty percent of the treble damages awarded in a qui tam FCA 
lawsuit.45 The statute dictates what percentage relators may recover and 
indicates that a relator's recovery depends in part on whether the United 
States opts or declines to intervene in the qui tam action, a decision left to the 
                                                             
41 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 
242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
42 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B) & (a)(1)(G) (2012); see 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1), (a)(2) & (a)(7) (2012). 
43 Id. 
44 See Bucy, supra note 12, at 1527–28 (describing amendments). 
45 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (describing awards when government 
intervenes in qui tam lawsuit); see also id. at § 3730(d)(2) (explaining award 
when government declines intervention). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 254 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.50 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
Spring 2013  
discretion of the Attorney General's office.46 Regardless of its choice, the 
United States remains the "real party in interest" to any FCA action.47 
Many of the False Claims Act lawsuits occurring under the auspices of 
the recent amendments have been initiated by qui tam relators.48 Relators 
must file their qui tam FCA complaints under seal and serve the government 
with a copy of the complaint, together with "substantially all material 
evidence and information" in the relator's possession.49 The complaint must 
then remain sealed for at least sixty days or until the court orders the seal 
lifted, ostensibly so that the government may investigate the merits of the 
relator's allegations without "tipping off" the defendant.50 The government 
may move to extend the seal "for good cause shown."51 In addition to 
allowing government investigation, certain mechanisms built into the FCA 
and discussed below aim to limit qui tam actions to avoid meritless, 
duplicative or harassing qui tam litigation. 
1. THE "PUBLIC DISCLOSURE" BAR 
One safeguard against superfluous qui tam False Claims Act lawsuits is 
the so-called "public disclosure bar," which provides that a private individual 
may only sue under the FCA if the information underlying that individual's 
FCA allegations has not been publicly disclosed or, if the information has 
been made public, the individual is otherwise "an original source of" such 
                                                             
46 See id. § 3730(c). 
47 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body 
Armor, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2011) ("[T]he United States is 
the real party in interest in a qui tam action filed by a relator."). 
48 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 26. 
49 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. § 3730(b)(3). 
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information.52 The "original source" provision only benefits a would-be 
relator who "has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the 
publicly disclosed [information], and who has voluntarily provided the 
information to the Government before filing an action under" the FCA's qui 
tam provision.53 If these requirements are not met, a court cannot entertain 
the prospective relator's FCA lawsuit.54 
This limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction over qui tam FCA actions 
aims to "strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out 
fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits."55 As such, the FCA requires that a 
prospective relator claiming to be an "original source" of information about 
FCA violations have "direct and independent knowledge" of the alleged 
violation.56 It follows that a relator cannot base his qui tam FCA claims upon 
a "mere suspicion that there must be a false or fraudulent claim lurking 
around somewhere."57 This principle helps effectuate the statute's plain 
language meant to, and courts' role of, filtering out unfounded qui tam FCA 
claims.58 
2. RULE 9(B) 
Heightened pleading requirements should also serve to prevent 
individuals from asserting meritless claims under the False Claims Act. As 
                                                             
52 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
53 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
54 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
55 Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1407 (2010). 
56 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Technol., 
Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 582–83 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
57 United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 353 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
58 See Graham Cnty., 130 S. Ct. at 1407. 
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with all federal claims for relief, all qui tam complaints arising under the 
FCA must satisfy the relatively lenient general pleading requirement of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint state 
facts establishing a "plausible," rather than merely "conceivable," claim for 
relief.59 Further, as the FCA is fundamentally a fraud statute,60 a qui tam 
relator must plead FCA violations with the particularity required by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),61 which requires that pleadings allege "fraud or 
mistake" with "particularity."62 
The basic test of whether a complaint alleges fraud with sufficient 
particularity is relatively uniform across federal courts, requiring details of 
"the time, place and contents of the false representation[], as well as the 
identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what that person 
obtained thereby."63 In other words, the party alleging fraud must identify the 
"who, what, where, and when of the" purported fraud at issue.64 These 
                                                             
59 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 674–75 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 
(2007)). 
60 United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) ("[B]oth 
the history and language of the False Claims Act, as well as the thrust of our 
prior decisions[,] . . . suggest that the Act was intended to reach all types of 
fraud."). 
61 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). 
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686–87 (2009) 
(noting that Rule 9(b) does not give a party "license to evade the less rigid—
though still operative—strictures of Rule 8."). 
63 See, e.g., Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 186 (citation omitted); see also United 
States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(citations omitted). 
64 See United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods. L.P, 579 
F.3d 13, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotations omitted); accord 
Joshi, 441 F.3d at 556 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (applying 
standard articulated in Grubbs and adding that, "[p]ut another way, the 
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requirements ensure that allegations of fraud are sufficiently specific to give 
defendants notice of the "precise misconduct" charged against them and also 
to "protect defendants' reputations by safeguarding them against spurious 
allegations of immoral and fraudulent behavior."65 Thus, Rule 9(b), like the 
FCA's public disclosure bar, should provide a check on qui tam FCA claims 
by relators motivated by "personal ill will or the hope of gain" and who lack 
sufficient information to actually establish an FCA violation.66 
3. THE STATUTE(S) OF LIMITATIONS 
Lastly, in theory, the False Claims Act's statute of limitations should 
prompt relators to file their qui tam lawsuits in a relatively timely fashion. 
Otherwise, relators could and would have a powerful financial incentive to 
simply "sit on their claims" for an indefinite period of time, thereby letting 
their potential recovery from alleged false claims "to build up over time," 
before notifying the government of fraud against it.67 Presumably to avoid 
this result, the FCA's statute of limitations mandates that: 
A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought— 
(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the 
violation of section 3729 is committed, or 
                                                                                                                              
complaint must identify the who, what, where, when, and how of the alleged 
fraud."). 
65 United States ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 557 F. Supp. 2d 
522, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
66 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 
939, 949 (1997) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) ("[Qui tam statutes 
are] passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern 
civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective means of 
preventing fraud upon the Treasury is to make perpetrators of them liable to 
actions by private persons acting, if please, under the strong stimulus of 
personal ill will or the hope of gain."). 
67 United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., 546 F.3d 288, 295 
(4th Cir. 2008). 
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(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material 
to the right of action are known or reasonably should 
have been known by the official of the United States 
charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, 
but in no event more than 10 years after the date on 
which the violation is committed, 
whichever occurs last.68 
Unfortunately, subparagraph (2) of the foregoing is ambiguous with 
regard to when, if ever, a qui tam relator may benefit from the tolling 
provision contained therein and, as elaborated below, this uncertainty has 
caused fairly substantial confusion on a practical level. In particular, courts 
have been and remain split as to whether the tolling provision in section 
3731(b)(2) applies to qui tam FCA cases in which the United States has 
declined to intervene.69 The varying applications of this statute, as well as the 
reasons for such applications and their potential implications for defendants 
in qui tam FCA lawsuits, are explained below. 
II. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN QUI TAM ACTIONS 
As noted above, due in large part to the expansion accomplished by the 
1986 amendments to the False Claims Act, the FCA is now frequently used 
as a major means of enforcing Medicare fraud and abuse laws.70 The FCA's 
qui tam provisions are particularly influential in this context, where private 
relators, often insider employees or officers of healthcare providers and 
pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturers, have increasingly sought to 
enforce the FCA against entities those individuals perceive to be defrauding 
                                                             
68 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). 
69 See Sanders, 546 F.3d at 296 (citations omitted) (noting that this 
"issue has admittedly given rise to different approaches in the federal 
courts."). 
70 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 4–5. 
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federally-funded healthcare programs.71 Many of these qui tam lawsuits are 
premised upon alleged violations the Government might not otherwise 
prosecute,72 and thus at times provide a valuable added option to curb fraud 
on the government. 
Yet the qui tam action may at times be a double-edged sword. A greedy 
relator may find it advantageous to hold off on notifying the Government of 
fraud, at least for a while, as the amount a potential defendant obtains from 
the government by way of false claims, and therefore the relator's potential 
recovery, continues to increase.73 Indeed, legislative history indicates that, for 
all the relator-friendly changes in the 1986 Amendments, Congress intended 
                                                             
71 See Winn W. Halverhout et al., The 2012 OIG Work Plan: A Review 
of Key Focus Areas, 14 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE No. 2, Mar.–Apr. 
2012, 39, 39 ("[T]he government has used the False Claims Act to recover 
nearly six billion dollars over the past two years, and there has been a rise in 
qui tam (whistleblower) suits."). See also Richard P. Church, Enrollment 
Strategies for Managing Successor Liability in Health Care Transactions, 
ASPATORE (Aug. 2012), 2012 WL 3058523, *6 n.10 ("Under the FCA, false 
claims are subject to treble damages plus potential penalties of $5,500 to 
$11,000 per claim. Of particular importance[,] . . . the [FCA] provides for qui 
tam relators to bring an action on the government's behalf and participate in a 
portion of the recovery directly. This incentive has created substantial energy 
around private whistleblower actions under facts that prosecutors would 
likely often not pursue."). 
72 See Church, supra note 71, at *6. See also, e.g., Steven D. Tibbets, 
The (Latest) Final Rule on FAPIIS: What It Means and What to Do About It, 
47 PROCUREMENT L., Spring 2012, at 1, 22–23 (footnotes and citations 
omitted) ("Under the False Claims Act, relators—i.e., whistleblowers—who 
report fraud can receive a substantial percentage of any amount the 
government recovers as a result of the report. Thus, the False Claims Act 
creates an incentive for potential whistleblowers to assert claims."). 
73 See Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295–96 (citations omitted). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 260 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2013.50 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
Spring 2013  
for the FCA's statute of limitations to be tolled only for cases in which the 
government was a party.74 
Nonetheless, not all courts have read the False Claims Act statute of 
limitations the same way. As detailed below, at least one court in each Circuit 
has considered whether the tolling provision applies to relators. Of those 
courts that have held the tolling provision of section 3731(b)(2) applicable to 
qui tam actions, most have indicated that a relator qualifies as the "official of 
the United States" referenced in that statute.75 Others seem inclined to apply 
the FCA's tolling provision across the board.76 However, the majority of 
courts have declined to toll the statute of limitations in qui tam FCA actions 
unless the Government has intervened and is therefore actively participating 
in the lawsuit.77 As explained below, the last and majority position provides 
                                                             
74 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-660 at 25 (1986) ("It was brought to the 
attention of the Committee that fraud is often difficult to detect and that the 
statute of limitations should not preclude the Government from bringing a 
cause of action under this Act if they were not aware of the fraud. The 
Committee agreed that this was unfair and so expanded the statute of 
limitations. However, the Committee did not intend to allow the Government 
to bring fraud actions ad infinitum, and therefore imposed the strict 10 year 
limit on False Claims Act cases.") (emphasis added). 
75 See United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 
1217–18 (9th Cir. 1996). See also United States ex rel. Hudalla v. Walsh 
Constr. Co., 834 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2011); United States ex rel. 
Klein v. Omeros Corp., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 4874031, *1–2 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 15, 2012) (affirming continued validity of Hyatt). 
76 See United States ex rel. Ven-a-Care, Inc. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic 
LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 262, 273–74 (D. Mass. 2009) (citing United States ex 
rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs., Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82–89 
(D.D.C. 2007); United States ex rel. Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys., Inc., 
464 F. Supp. 2d 766 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. 
Fresenius Med. Care, 2008 WL 4277150, *7–8 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2008)). 
77 See Sanders, 546 F.3d at 296 (noting that majority of district courts 
follow this approach); id. at 293 (holding that FCA tolling provision applies 
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the best interpretation of the False Claims Act's statute of limitations in terms 
of statutory interpretation, policy and practical considerations. 
A. THE FIRST MINORITY APPROACH: ARBITRARY TOLLING 
Some courts have decided that in some circumstances relators may avail 
themselves of the tolling provision in the False Claims Act statute of 
limitations.78 For instance, in United States ex rel. Harris v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit declared that section 3731(b)(2) should apply even in 
qui tam actions where the United States has not intervened.79 Applying a 
somewhat tortuous analysis, the court validated its approach by noting that, in 
such cases, "a qui tam plaintiff" must be the "official of the United States" 
referenced in the FCA's statute of limitations because "[t]he qui tam plaintiff 
is the only person charged with the responsibility to act in [such] 
circumstances."80 The court did limit the tolling, however, such that "the 
three-year extension of the statute of limitations begins to run once the qui 
                                                                                                                              
"only in cases in which the United States is a party."). See also United States 
ex rel. Thistlethwaite v. Dowty Woodville Polymer, Ltd., 6 F. Supp. 2d 263, 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("By the clear statutory language, the Relator's time is 
not extended to three years after the United States official learns of the 
violation. That provision only applies to the government.") (citations 
omitted); United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 162, 172–73 (D.D.C. 1998); United States ex rel. Schuhardt v. 
Washington Univ., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2002); United 
States ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, 671 F. Supp. 2d 674, 694–95 (E.D. Pa. 
2009); United States ex rel. King v. Solvay S.A., 823 F. Supp. 2d 472, 538 
(S.D. Tex. 2011), order vacated in part on other grounds, 2012 WL 1067228 
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012); United States ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., 2012 
WL 4473265, *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2012). 
78 See Hyatt, 91 F.3d at 1217–18 (citations omitted). See also Harris, 
2012 WL 5866204 at *11. 
79 Hyatt, 91 F.3d at 1217 (citations omitted). 
80 Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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tam plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known the facts material to his 
right of action."81 
Notably, the court in Hyatt nonetheless found that the False Claims Act 
allegations before it were untimely, rejecting the relator's contention that "the 
FCA statute of limitations began running when officials within the United 
States Government learned of the alleged fraud through service of [the 
relator's] complaint" on the government.82 The court found this position 
untenable, as it "would permit relators to control the length of their own 
limitations period by withholding their allegations until they are prepared to 
sue," which in turn "would frustrate the purposes of a limitation period and 
the purposes of the [False Claims] Act."83 The court noted the danger in 
allowing relators "to wait nearly ten years to sue," which could "allow fraud 
to continue and losses to mount."84 Additionally, it could possibly "interfere 
with law enforcement," in light of the five-year statute of limitations on 
criminal fraud charges, as "the government will lose the right to seek a 
criminal penalty" whenever "relators wait over five years to report the 
fraud."85 
Other courts have, albeit less clearly, followed the approach first 
adopted in Hyatt. For example, in United States ex rel. Hadalla v. Walsh 
Construction Co., a court in the Northern District of Illinois rejected a 
defendant's "statute of limitations defense" because the relator had filed the 
qui tam lawsuit "within three years after he became aware of [the defendant's] 
billing practices" at issue in that case and "within ten years of the alleged 
                                                             
81 Id. at 1217–18. 
82 Id. at 1218. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (citation omitted). 
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FCA violations upon which he sue[d]."86 Similarly, in an unpublished 
opinion, the Third Circuit indicated agreement with Hyatt by stressing that 
the timing of a relator's knowledge of the alleged fraud was of paramount 
importance in determining whether the court should "apply the six year 
statute of limitations in § 3731(b)(1), or the three year limitation in 
§ 3731(b)(2)."87 
B. THE SECOND MINORITY APPROACH: BLANKET TOLLING 
On the other hand, some district courts have rejected the reasoning of 
Hyatt and its kind in favor of a broader application of the tolling provision in 
subsection 3731(b)(2) to qui tam actions. Perhaps the most detailed analysis 
in this vein was performed by a court in the District of Columbia in United 
States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers.88 The court in Pogue 
purported to consider the language of section 3731(b)(2) as well related 
legislative history and policy before concluding that the FCA's limitations 
tolling provision clearly applies to relators regardless of whether the 
government has intervened in a qui tam action.89 
Looking first to the statutory text, the Pogue court concluded that the 
tolling provision should apply to both relators and the Government because 
the statute "does not differentiate between" qui tam FCA actions and FCA 
suits pursued by the United States and it "does not contain any negative 
words of exclusion," suggesting that the Government but not relators should 
benefit from the tolling provision; "the structure of § 3731(b)" groups 
together, then distinguishes relators and the United States; and subsection 
                                                             
86 United States ex rel. Hudalla v. Walsh Construction Co., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 816, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
87 United States ex rel. Malloy v. Telephonics Corp., 68 F. App'x 270, 
273 (3d Cir. 2003). 
88 See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of 
America, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82–89 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
89 See id. 
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3731(b)(2) "use[s] a very specific phrase" to indicate who may benefit from 
the tolling provision instead of a "generic, careless label" that might 
inadvertently conflate government official and qui tam relator.90 
Next, though noting that "[n]o further inquiry is appropriate" because it 
found the plain language of the statute clear, the Pogue court nonetheless 
examined legislative history and congressional intent behind the FCA, which 
the Court deemed "perfectly harmonious with" its interpretation.91 In 
particular, the Court remarked that House and Senate reports both "talk in 
specific terms about the knowledge of government officials[ ] . . . and do not 
reveal any intent to allow the limitations period to be based on someone else's 
knowledge."92 Moreover, the Pogue court rejected as incongruous the 
premise underlying "the Hyatt school of cases . . . that (b)(2)'s reference to an 
'official of the United States' must implicitly include relators," proclaiming 
that "the Court cannot warp a statute's plain language merely to make sense 
out of the legislative history."93 Thus, as the Court in Pogue had determined 
that the FCA's tolling provision clearly applied to relators and government 
officials alike, it disregarded contrary explanations of legislative history.94 
Lastly, the Pogue court looked to "[p]urposes of the FCA" to support its 
declaration that the False Claims Act's statute of limitations could be tolled 
for qui tam relators in any case.95 The Court identified these purposes as 
primarily "to detect, punish and deter the submission of false claims, while 
seeking to restore funds to the federal fisc."96 Acknowledging that FCA 
relators are "often motivated largely by self-interest to report and prosecute 
                                                             
90 Id. at 84–86. 
91 Id. at 85. 
92 Id. at 86. 
93 Id. at 87. 
94 Pogue, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 
95 See id. at 87–89. 
96 Id. at 87. 
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alleged false claims," the Court added that the FCA's qui tam "provisions 
seek to strike a balance between the interests of the government and the self-
interest of relators."97 The Pogue court opined that its interpretation of the 
FCA statute of limitations "advances those governmental interests" in two 
ways, as "[m]easuring (b)(2)'s limitations period by the government's 
knowledge, and never the relator's," could assure "that (1) the government's 
rights will never be impaired by the relator's conduct; and (2) the government 
will be able to recover upon the maximum amount of claims within the 
overall ten-year repose period."98 
The Pogue court also downplayed the concern expressed by other courts 
that tolling the limitations period for qui tam actions could allow relators to 
"sleep on their rights," deciding instead that relators really "have no rights on 
which to sleep" and may in fact be subjected to reduced recoveries for not 
acting promptly.99 In addition, the court predicted that denying tolling in qui 
tam actions where the Government declined intervention would produce 
"vexing scenarios" in which the government might "increase the defendant's 
exposure by deciding to intervene at the outset" or "after the litigation has 
advanced significantly," a result the Pogue court perceived as "antithetical to 
the purposes of statutes of limitations and repose, which seek in part to afford 
some measure of predictability and finality to litigation."100 The court 
similarly rejected "the Hyatt approach" as creating "the flipside" of such 
problems, as "if relators and the government are only bound by their own 
knowledge, then the government could expand the statute of limitations by 
intervening in a qui tam case."101 
Other district courts have reached similar results, though without equally 
in-depth analysis. For instance, in United States ex rel. Salmeron v. 
                                                             
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 87–88. 
99 Id. at 88. 
100 Pogue, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
101 Id. at 89. 
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Enterprise Recovery Systems, a court in the Northern District of Illinois 
rejected a defendant's plea to apply the Hyatt approach, noting that the 
defendant's stance "essentially ignore[s]" that section 3731(b) suggests courts 
should initiate the limitations period from whichever alternative "occurs 
last."102 Further, the Salmeron court declared that "Hyatt reads like a 
conjurer's trick" that "converts the qui tam plaintiff" into an "official of the 
United States," a manipulation amounting to "judicial legislation" contrary to 
the FCA's plain language.103 Accordingly, the court tolled the statute of 
limitations and found the relator's claims were not time-barred.104 
This approach was also recently adopted by a court in the District of 
Massachusetts in United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care, Inc. v. Actavis Mid 
Atlantic LLC.105 In that case, the court noted and briefly described various 
courts' divergent interpretations of whether and under what circumstances the 
tolling provision in the FCA statute of limitations applies to qui tam 
actions.106 Acknowledging that the issue is "debatable," the court found cases 
like Pogue and Salmeron seemingly "most consistent with the language of the 
statute," which "does not expressly limit the tolling provision to the 
Government" and vests the person who initiated the action with "the right to 
conduct" the qui tam FCA action, such that "the relator has the right to invoke 
the provisions of the statute, including the tolling provision."107 The Ven-A-
Care court also remarked that, while the "drafters of the FCA knew how to 
delineate between the rights and responsibilities of the Government" and 
private parties, "they chose not to limit the tolling provision to the 
                                                             
102 United States ex rel. Salmeron v. Enterprise Recovery Systems, 464 
F. Supp. 2d 766, 769 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 770. 
105 United States ex rel. Ven-A-Care, Inc. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC, 
659 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Mass. 2009). 
106 Id. at 273 (citations omitted). 
107 Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3)). 
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Government."108 Accordingly, the court extended the tolling provision in 
subsection 3731(b)(2) to the qui tam action.109 
C. THE MAJORITY APPROACH: TOLL ONLY IF THE UNITED 
STATES HAS INTERVENED 
The majority's approach, expressed and applied by both district courts 
and some appellate panels, have for a number of reasons declined to apply the 
tolling provision of section 3731(b)(2) to qui tam False Claims Act cases in 
which the United States has declined to intervene. Perhaps the leading case 
articulating the rationale underlying this approach comes from a 2008 
decision of the Fourth Circuit in United States ex rel. Sanders v. North 
American Bus Industries, in which the court held "that Section 3731(b)(2) 
extends the FCA's statute of limitations beyond six years only in cases in 
which the United States is a party."110 
Contrary to the cases described above, the Sanders court remarked that 
it "would be problematic to read the text of the statute any other way."111 
Specifically, the tolling provision itself "refers only to the United States—and 
not to relators," thereby suggesting that "Congress intended Section 
3731(b)(2) to extend the FCA's default six-year period only in cases in which 
the government is a party, rather than to produce the bizarre scenario in which 
the limitations period . . . depends on the knowledge of a nonparty to the" qui 
tam action.112 Moreover, the government's knowledge of "material 
information" would not put the relator on notice, such that the limitations 
period in a non-intervened qui tam action "cannot reasonably begin" based 
                                                             
108 Ven-A-Care, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
109 Id. 
110 United States ex rel. Sanders v. North American Bus Industries, 546 
F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2008). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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upon the Government's knowledge.113 Furthermore, government officials are 
not "charged with responsibility to ensure that a relator brings a timely FCA 
action."114 Thus, the court reasoned, it would contravene statutory text to 
extend the tolling provision to relators in cases to which the United States is 
not a party.115 
The Sanders court next bolstered its analysis by comparing the language 
of section 3731(b)(2) to that in 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c), which contains nearly 
identical language and "tolls the generally applicable statute of limitations in 
actions brought by the United States—and only the United States—until 'facts 
material to the right of action' are actually or constructively known by an 
'official of the United States charged with the responsibility to act in the 
circumstances.'"116 The court also rejected the relator's argument that the 
tolling provision should apply because section 3731(b)(2) refers to "[a] civil 
action under section 3730" and section 3730 describes both direct and qui tam 
actions.117 The court found this argument unavailing for two reasons. First, 
the statute would make no sense if read to apply to non-intervened qui tam 
actions because it specifically distinguishes between qui tam and direct 
actions, and second, the phrase "a civil action" in the context of the statute of 
limitations is "restrictive language referring to the United States—and not to 
relators," and makes clear that the tolling provision only applies to the subset 
of civil actions in which the Government is an actual party.118 
The Sanders court concluded its analysis by citing the "numerous 
practical difficulties" that would result from extending the section 3731(b)(2) 
                                                             
113 Id. at 294. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Sanders, 546 F.3d at 294. 
117 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
118 Id. at 294–95 (citations omitted). 
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tolling provision to non-intervened qui tam actions.119 First, the court noted, 
if the statute of limitations were dependent on the knowledge of a nonparty 
government official, defendants and the Government would be subjected to 
undue burdens as defendants would be forced to seek out and litigate the 
identity and knowledge of the relevant government official and the 
Government "would be subjected to disruption and expense in responding to 
discovery requests in actions in which the Government affirmatively chose to 
avoid those concerns by declining to intervene."120 
Moreover, relators would be able "to sit on their claims for up to ten 
years" before notifying the Government, let alone potential defendants, of the 
fraud allegations.121 This concern, enhanced by the fact that "relators would 
have a strong financial incentive to allow false claims to build over time" and 
thereby increase relators' "own potential recovery" before filing a complaint, 
gives rise to a number of undesirable results.122 For example, relators would 
be able to "extend the limitations period at will," which would make "the six-
year limitation period in Section 3731(b)(1) superfluous in nearly all FCA 
cases," so that extending the tolling provision to relators would contravene 
the need "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."123 
In addition, "allowing relators to sit on their claims" for up to ten years 
"would undermine the purposes of" the FCA's qui tam provisions, namely "to 
combat fraud quickly and efficiently by encouraging relators to bring actions 
that the government cannot or will not."124 Finally, broadly tolling the FCA 
statute of limitations would prevent the Government from criminally 
prosecuting predicate fraud whenever the relator fails to notify the 
                                                             
119 Id. at 295. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295. 
123 Id. (citations omitted). 
124 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 
(1943)). 
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government of the suspected false claims within five years of the last such 
claim.125 Thus, the court declined to extend section 3731(b)(2) to non-
intervened qui tam FCA cases. 
Other courts have reached the same result based on a variety of theories, 
mostly incorporating at least some of the reasoning articulated in Sanders. 
Some have simply proclaimed without more that the plain language of section 
3731(b)(2) applies only to the government, presumably due to the reference 
to an "official of the United States."126 Other courts have reiterated this 
premise and have added some "practical" considerations mentioned in 
Sanders for instances that extending the tolling provision "would allow future 
qui tam relators to allow false claims to build up, to the detriment of the 
government and thereby obtain a larger recovery by sitting on their hands 
until the end of the ten year period."127 
                                                             
125 Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295. 
126 See, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. Dowty Woodville Polymer, Ltd., 6 F. 
Supp. 2d 263, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), ("By the clear statutory language, the 
Relator's time is not extended to three years after the United States official 
learns of the violation. That provision applies only to the government."). See 
United States ex rel. Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 
1029 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (stating, without elaboration, that "[t]he statute of 
limitations for FCA cases, in which the government does not intervene, is six 
years.") (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3731). See also Gale, 2012 WL 4473265 at *5 
(explaining and holding that language of subsection 3731(b)(2) supports 
applying six-year limitations period and not tolling provision to qui tam 
actions in which United States has not intervened); United States ex rel. King 
v. Solvay S.A., 823 F. Supp. 2d 472, 538 (S.D. Tex. 2011), order vacated in 
part on other grounds, 2012 WL 1067228 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012) 
("Subsection 3731(b)(2) refers only to the United States[.] . . . Allowing 
relators to take advantage of a tolling provision that specifically mentions the 
government and does not refer to relators runs contrary to the purpose of 
allowing qui tam relators to proceed with the action in the first place."). 
127 United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 162, 172–73 (D.D.C. 1998) (citations omitted). 
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A court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States ex rel. 
Bauchwitz v. Holloman undertook its analysis of the tolling issue by starting 
with an examination of when the limitations period begins.128 Noting "a lack 
of unanimity" on this issue, the court deduced from both "the plain language 
of § 3729(a)" and precedent of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit "that 
the application for payment, rather than payment of the claim, triggers the 
accrual of an [FCA] action."129 Based on reasoning quite similar to that 
employed in the Sanders line of cases, the court concluded that it would be 
"inconsistent with established legal principles and the purpose of the FCA" to 
allow relators to wait "for damages to start accumulating before starting the 
FCA clock ticking."130 In other words, "[i]f a private relator knows a claim is 
false when it is made, he cannot wait until payment is made to blow the 
whistle," as "the government will suffer increased harm while losses 
increase" whenever a relator with knowledge of fraud prolongs the time 
before he apprises the Government of the false claims involved.131 
Having determined that an FCA cause of action accrues when the 
defendant makes a false claim, the Bauchwitz court next assessed whether the 
tolling provision in section 3731(b)(2) would apply to qui tam actions in 
which the Government has not intervened.132 The court observed that the 
earlier Third Circuit opinion suggested "an expansive view of the relator's 
status" consistent with the Hyatt line of cases.133 However, the court further 
noted that such an "expansive view" had been invalidated by the Supreme 
                                                             
128 United States ex rel. Bauchwitz v. Holloman, 671 F. Supp. 2d 674, 
685 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
129 Id. at 685–86 (citations omitted). 
130 Id. at 688. 
131 Id. 
132 Bauchwitz, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (citations omitted). 
133 Id. at 693–94 (citing Rodriguez v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 
552 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2008)); see United States ex rel. Malloy v. Telephonics 
Corp., 68 F. App'x 270 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Court in United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York.134 In Eisenstein, 
the Court held that a "relator cannot be deemed to have the same status as the 
government" in a non-intervened FCA action because, though the 
Government retains "an interest in an FCA case in which it has not 
intervened," that "interest does not convert the government's status as a real 
party in interest to that of a 'party' in the litigation."135 The Bauchwitz court 
construed Eisenstein to preclude application of the section 3731(b)(2) tolling 
provision in non-intervened qui tam actions.136 
In sum, the line of cases declining to apply the tolling provision in 
section 3731(b)(2) to non-intervened qui tam FCA cases repeatedly stress the 
importance of constraining the time in which relators might bring such cases 
to avoid thwarting both the FCA's anti-fraud impetus and the efficiency 
principles underlying the qui tam mechanism. This overriding rationale, 
coupled with practical concerns about discovery complications and 
disagreement over whether the relator is in fact an "official of the 
government," has produced the leading opinion that the statute of limitations 
for False Claims Act cases should be tolled only for cases in which the 
United States is an active participant. The varying interpretations of how the 
FCA statute of limitations applies in qui tam actions may significantly impact 
defense costs to healthcare providers and, indirectly, increase costs passed 
along to healthcare consumers. The potential increase in consumer costs will 
presumably correspond with the time span of allegations, therefore lending in 
favor of constraining the limitations period to the fullest extent possible. 
                                                             
134 United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 
(2009). 
135 Bauchwitz, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (citing Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 
932–34). 
136 Bauchwitz, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 694–95 (citations omitted). 
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III. FINANCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PROLIFERATING QUI TAM FCA 
ACTIONS 
The recent dramatic increase in FCA recoveries may impact the 
healthcare industry in various ways. The Obama Administration has made 
clear the importance of reducing healthcare costs, including through FCA 
enforcement,137 so much so that in 2009 the Departments of Justice and 
Health and Human Services (HHS) formed the "HEAT Task Force"138 with 
the intent of bringing "the fight against Medicare fraud" to "a Cabinet-level 
priority."139 The FCA is among the most powerful weapons140 in this fight, as 
it permits qui tam actions premised not only upon direct violations of the 
FCA but also indirectly141 upon violations of other anti-fraud statutes. 
Perhaps the most important laws in this later class are the federal Anti-
Kickback Statute142 ("AKS") and the physician self-referral law, more 
commonly known as the Stark Act,143 both of which can only be directly 
                                                             
137 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, SPRING 2011 SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, PART III: 
LEGAL & INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
(2011), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/  
semiannual/2011/spring/SAR03-Legal+Investigative.pdf. 
138 "HEAT" stands for Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement 
Action Team. See HEAT Task Force, STOPMEDICAREFRAUD.GOV, http:// 
www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/heattaskforce/index.html (accessed 
Aug. 22, 2012). 
139 Id. 
140 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 137. 
141 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 
659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (discussing distinction 
between FCA claims based on "factually" versus "legally" false claims). 
142 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2012). 
143 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012). See also Physician Self-Referral, 
CMS.gov, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelf 
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enforced by the government.144 As courts now universally recognize the 
validity of qui tam FCA claims premised upon a defendant's "false 
certification" of compliance with the AKS and/or Stark Act, relators now 
have the power to indirectly enforce statutes they could not otherwise invoke. 
This increased power in turn presumably heightens the vulnerability of 
defendant healthcare goods and service providers, which in turn may have the 
perverse effect of increasing healthcare costs as FCA defendants pass along 
increased litigation and settlement costs to consumers. 
These effects could be dramatically magnified with any expansion of the 
amount of time a relator may "sit on" allegations of fraud while false claims-
related damages continue to accrue. Indeed, the costs facing FCA defendants 
are quite disproportionate to the actual cost of any false claim to the United 
States. Specifically, FCA defendants must not only reimburse the government 
for fraudulently-obtained funds, they must pay that amount two more times 
due to the treble damages allowed by the FCA.145 It is unclear whether and in 
what amount such costs will be passed on to healthcare consumers.146 
However, it is clear that potential defendants are specifically allocating 
substantial resources, which presumably could otherwise be expended for 
furnishing or producing healthcare-related goods and services, to the expense 
of defending and possibly litigating FCA cases. For instance, in 2011, 
pharmaceutical manufacturer Abbott Laboratories set aside $1.5 billion in 
litigation reserves in light of settlement discussions with the Department of 
Justice related in part to FCA-related allegations.147 Similarly, also in 2011, 
                                                                                                                              
Referral/index.html?redirect=/PhysicianSelfReferral (accessed Aug. 22, 
2012) (describing Stark Law and discussing its several names). 
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(a) (making clear that prohibitions in AKS 
are criminal in nature); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (describing 
"sanctions" for Stark Law violations). 
145 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
146 See Kennedy, supra note 13; cf. Catan, supra note 13. 
147 See, e.g., Press Release, Abbott Labs., Abbott Report Strong Ongoing 
Third Quarter Results; Confirms Double-Digit Ongoing Earnings Growth 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer Amgen reserved $780 million to settle, among 
other things, qui tam allegations of false claims to Medicaid due to Amgen's 
sales and marketing activities.148 Even the DOJ recognizes that defendants 
may be beginning to treat FCA defense as a cost of doing business,149 which 
if true threatens to divest the FCA of any deterrent power and render it simply 
a device for restitution and punishment. 
These facts highlight the merit of the reasoning of the majority of courts 
declining to toll the FCA's statute of limitations in non-intervened qui tam 
cases. This is particularly true of the premise that tolling the statute would 
defeat the purposes of the False Claims Act and its qui tam provisions by 
enabling relators to hide, for a protracted period of time, information about 
false claims from the government and conceal allegations from defendants 
until it is convenient for relators to sue.150 It is likely that damages would 
accumulate between the points in time where the relator learned of the fraud 
and when he finally chose to sue. This accumulation is magnified if the 
defendant is found liable because the defendant is required to pay treble 
damages.151 
Additionally, with the passage of time, any information in a defendant's 
possession relating to the alleged false claims may become increasingly 
                                                                                                                              
Outlook for 2011 (Oct. 19, 2011), available at https://www.abbott.com/news-
media/press-releases/2011-oct19.htm. 
148 See Press Release, Amgen, Amgen's Third Quarter 2011 Revenue & 
Adjusted Earnings Per Share (EPS) Each Increased 3 Percent to $3.9 Billion 
and $1.40 (Oct. 24, 2011), available at http://www.amgen.com/media/ 
media_pr_detail.jsp?releaseID=1620695. 
149 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General Stuart F. Delery Speaks at the American Bar Association's Ninth 
National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act & Qui Tam Enforcement 
(June 7, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/ 
2012/civ-speech-1206071.html. 
150 See, e.g., Sanders, 546 F.3d at 294. 
151 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
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difficult, or even impossible, to locate when the defendant finally does learn 
of the FCA allegations. Defendants may not become aware of FCA 
allegations until much later because even after a relator decides to file an 
FCA complaint the government may request that the complaint remain sealed 
for at least an additional sixty days.152 The only limitation on the 
government's ability to extend the seal is a statutory requirement that the 
government show "good cause" for such extension.153 This secretive 
procedure may prevent defendants from learning of FCA allegations for 
months, even though the passage of time increases the likelihood that 
defendants may be unable to locate information related to the alleged false 
claims.154 These discovery costs not only burden FCA defendants with 
discovery costs over and above possible damages liability, they further create 
an incentive to settle qui tam allegations that may in fact be meritless. 
Thus, the cost of FCA allegations to a defendant could increase 
exponentially with any time beyond the FCA's fairly generous six-year statute 
of limitations155 during which the relator may pile on allegations that add to 
the defendant's already heavy dual burdens of defense and settlement or 
damage costs. The argument to the contrary in the Pogue line of cases—that 
would-be relators are unlikely to "sleep on their rights," and do not really 
have a strong incentive to do so in order to allow claims and damages to 
accumulate, because the "original source" bar might reduce or foreclose 
potential recovery in a qui tam action156—is puzzling and seems plainly 
inaccurate. There is no indication that after seven, eight, or nine years there 
might be a "public disclosure" of information about FCA violations that was 
previously hidden for the previous six years, and indeed such result seems 
counterintuitive at best. Moreover, one main purpose of the FCA's qui tam 
mechanism is to allow private relators to bring to light violations that might 
                                                             
152 See id. § 3730(b). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). 
156 Pogue, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
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otherwise remain hidden from the government and inhibit the United States' 
ability to seek recompense for such violations.157 
Accordingly, the lone argument against the damage accumulation and 
financial motivation rationale for not tolling the statute of limitations in non-
intervened qui tam False Claims Act cases is easily defeated. This leaves the 
necessary inference that excess expense of defending qui tam FCA cases, and 
the related prospect of defendants in the healthcare industry passing such 
costs along to consumers, could and should be curbed by constraining relators 
to the six-year limitations period. This conclusion is supported by the history 
and purpose of the False Claims Act, as well as practical considerations 
underlying its application. Consequently, in qui tam FCA actions in which the 
government has declined to intervene, relators' allegations must be based on 
false claims activity that has occurred within the six years preceding the date 
on which the relator chooses to file his complaint. The practice will result in 
the best outcome for both the defendants and United States, and therefore 
consumers can avoid assuming some of the costs to defendants of the FCA 
litigation. 
                                                             
157 See Bucy, supra note 12, at 1530 ("Government officials confirm the 
importance of insiders: 'Whistleblowers are essential to our operations. 
Without them, we wouldn't have cases. '") (quoting Lawrence J. Rhoades of 
HHS) (additional citations omitted). 
